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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Stephen Schulhofer, leading scholar of rape law, reporter for the
Model Penal Code (MPC) Sexual Assault Project, and founding father of the yesmeans-yes effort, 1 argues that it is high time, indeed “past time,” for U.S.
criminal law to require “affirmative consent” to sex. 2 I have been asked to
counter this assertion and make the case that sex without affirmative consent
should not be an activity regulated by the government through criminal
punishment. It is reasonable to understand the affirmative consent standard to
mean: (1) sex must proceed in an artificial, overly cautious manner, involving a
specific consent script, for example, asking for and receiving a “yes,” and (2) if

∗
Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I express special gratitude to Stephen
Schulhofer for being an advocate of fairness and reason in the criminal code, a tireless law reformer, and an
ethical and formidable debate opponent. Thanks also to Mike Vitiello and The University of Pacific Law
Review for arranging this timely conversation.
1. Schulhofer does not, himself, endorse “only yes means yes,” but his writings on affirmative consent
certainly helped pave the way for that movement. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, UNWANTED SEX: THE
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998) [hereinafter UNWANTED SEX]; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995) [hereinafter The
Feminist Challenge].
2. See Stephen Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 THE U. OF
PAC. L. REV. 665 (2016) [hereinafter Affirmative Consent]. Professor Schulhofer’s position has been evolving
during the drafting and editing process of this Essay. Thus, this Essay responds to the November 2015 draft of
his symposium essay, which is on file with the law review and author, and the pages referred to herein
correspond to that draft.
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sex does not proceed in such a manner, one or both parties risk incarceration with
inmates who might care little about consent, affirmative or not. 3 There are many
compelling critiques of this type of broad sex regulation, but I need not articulate
them here. 4 Professor Schulhofer’s proposal for this symposium and the related
revisions to the MPC’s sexual assault provisions (hereinafter “MPC Draft 5”), 5
which I refer to interchangeably as the “expressive consent” proposal, do not in
fact endorse this narrow vision of affirmative consent. Instead, they do something
else altogether―something that is not extremely radical, does not upend sexual
communication norms, and is not the embodiment of feminists’ radical views of
sex.
Schulhofer’s affirmative consent formulation is quite modest and unlikely to
seize headlines: sex must occur with consent, which the defendant may determine
from the all the circumstances, including words, conduct, and overall context. 6
Specifically, Schulhofer’s expressive consent proposal criminalizes sexual
penetration without “consent,” defined as “a person’s freely given agreement to
engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated by
conduct, words, or both.” 7 Importantly, the provision clarifies that “consent may
be explicit or it may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” 8 Thus, in
order to find guilt, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that, given the
entire picture of the situation, the defendant believed the sex was not consensual.
It might make for a more interesting read were I to level charges of
prudishness against Professor Schulhofer and call him the sex police who is
going to stamp out exciting ambiguity and make sex boring and vanilla, but I
cannot do so. The expressive consent proposal is light years away from schemes
involving sex contracts, a verbal “yes,” or even “clear” consent. It ultimately
allows for ambiguous communication and even the much-maligned traditional
sex script, 9 so long as, in the end, the jury finds that the defendant honestly and
non-recklessly believed the complainant agreed to sex.

3. See infra notes 36–46 and accompanying text (discussing common interpretations of affirmative
consent).
4. See infra notes 47–59 and accompanying text (briefly explaining debate over affirmative consent).
5. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Preliminary Draft No. 5,
October, 2015) [hereinafter MPC Draft 5] (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). The MPC
sexual assault project is ongoing, and there have been many different drafts with changing concepts of consent
since the writing of this Essay.
6. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id. at 4; see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 32 (providing that “[c]onsent means a person’s
positive, freely given agreement to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration” which must be
“communicated by conduct words, or both”).
8. MPC Draft 5 treats sex without consent as a misdemeanor and sex in the face of an “expressed . . .
refusal to consent” as a felony. Id. at 52. It is not entirely clear that Schulhofer’s essay differentiates between
sex without consent and sex in the face of refusal. See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2.
Consequently, I leave discussion of that disparity for another day.
9. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 7 (critiquing gendered sexual interaction); cf. Annika M.
Johnson & Stephanie M. Hoover, The Potential of Sexual Consent Interventions on College Campuses: A
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This Essay argues that, while Schulhofer’s formulation avoids the popular
critiques―or more accurately ridicule―of strict affirmative consent standards,
the proposal is problematic in other ways. The formulation is abstruse, perhaps
cleverly duplicitous, and it unnecessarily complicates the legal inquiry over
consent. First, by using the term “affirmative consent” and making arguments
about unambiguous green lights, 10 stopping and clarifying, 11 and moving social
norms, 12 Professor Schulhofer tacitly endorses, but does not ultimately have to
defend, the more radical and regulatory formulations of affirmative consent.
Second, the content of the formulation, perhaps because it seeks to straddle the
line between ordinary consent and yes means yes, is confusing and its manner of
application is not entirely clear.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. First, it will demonstrate that Schulhofer’s
proposal is, in fact, not affirmative consent, as the term is popularly understood.13
Second, it will argue that Schulhofer’s expressive consent proposal does not
necessarily fill the legal gaps he hopes it will, if indeed such gaps exist. 14 Third,
it will critique the project, both in terms of its choice of labels and its internally
mystifying nature. 15 In the end, the Essay asserts that the expressive consent
revision is not an improvement on, and in fact may be less desirable than, more
straightforward articulations of consent in rape law.16
II. NOT AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
In order to establish that Professor Schulhofer’s proposal is not affirmative
consent, some mapping is necessary. Accordingly, this Section provides a
working understanding of various meanings of “consent” and “affirmative
consent” to sex. It bears noting that this entire discussion sets aside the issue of
whether the criminal law should define acceptable and unacceptable sex in terms
of the complainant’s state of mind rather than in terms of the coercive means by
which the defendant procures sex. Schulhofer’s starting point is that the criminal
law has an interest whenever sex is unconsensual, regardless of why it is
Literature Review on the Barriers to Establishing Affirmative Sexual Consent, 4 PURE INSIGHTS 2–3 (2015),
available at http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=pure (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting extensive findings that young people continue to regard men as
sexual proponents and women as sexual gatekeepers and citing studies).
10. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 65 (asserting that silence should not be equated with a green light
to engage in penetration).
11. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that sex proponents have a “burden of inquiry”
as to sexual consent but indicating that the burden can be satisfied through “ascertain[ing] whether the other
party is willing”); see also infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing the expressive consent
standard’s connection to stop and ask).
12. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14; see also infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
13. Infra Part II.
14. Infra Part III.
15. Infra Part IV.
16. Infra Part V.
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unconsensual. 17 In fact, he regards the requirement of force as so passé and
archaic as to barely merit mention.18
The force-versus-consent debate is important, and something I take up
elsewhere. 19 For now, however, I will assume the liberal position that choice is
the dividing line between acceptable and criminal sex.20 Of course, the
philosopher in me queries, “Do we truly have free will?” And, the critical theorist
in me is sympathetic to the view that structural inequality renders choice as an
illusion and tool that preserves hierarchy. Indeed, radical feminists like Catharine
MacKinnon argue that given oppressive patriarchy, women rarely have sex
freely. 21 However, this Essay puts aside critiques of liberalism and the larger
debate of how sex fits into a feminist vision of state and society. Most proponents
of affirmative consent, Professor Schulhofer included, do not indulge the belief
that women’s consent to sex is always illusory. 22 Instead, they adhere to the
liberal notion that women authentically choose things, including sex, but debate
over how to ensure that sex is in fact consensual.23
A. Consent
So what does it mean to say that sex must be “consensual?” Lawyers,
philosophers, and social scientists are in fair agreement that there are different
but related ways to look at consent. 24 Consent can either be an internal mental
state of agreeing or being willing to do something, an external act of expressing
agreement to something regardless of internal feelings, or both internal
agreement and external communication.25 For many, the lynchpin of consent is
an internal decision, and they balk at the notion that sex might be called

17. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 1–2.
18. See id. at 1 (putting aside the force issue because the “unmistakable trend” toward consent).
19. See Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion. __ CARDOZO L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter
Gruber, Consent Confusion].
20. See Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of
Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38 (1995) (observing that “liberal feminism”
shaped rape reform in the “classic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy, and individual choice”); See generally
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. & PHIL. 35 (1992).
21. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983) [hereinafter Toward Feminist Jurisprudence] (stating “the conditions
of male dominance” in both rape and “consensual” intercourse make distinguishing the acts difficult; thus, “free
consent” to sex is rare for women); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in
Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1081, 1088 (2004) (remarking more recently that “unequal sex can
flourish and masquerade as equal sex, as sex as such, with the result that sex that is forced, coerced, and
pervasively unequal can be construed as consensual, wanted, and free”).
22. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 2.
23. See infra note 33 (asserting that the consent debate cannot avoid the issue of constraints on free
choice).
24. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3–5.
25. Id at 5. For a more extensive discussion of consent and affirmative consent, see Gruber, Consent
Confusion, supra note 19.
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“unconsensual” when both parties, in fact, mutually desired it. 26 Others feel that
asking a jury to divine the intent of a rape complainant sets up a difficult task that
jurors will fulfill simply by applying stereotypes or unreflectively embracing the
defendant’s version of events. 27 Thus, the jury should be directed to look at what
the complainant and defendant did, and not what the complainant thought.
Schulhofer’s proposal is a purported advance from the ordinary internal
consent inquiry in the sense that it explicitly embraces external consent and
specifies that “communication” of agreement is a necessary ingredient of lawful
sex. 28 The proposal makes it a crime to knowingly or recklessly engage in sexual
intercourse without “consent,” which “means a person’s freely given agreement
to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated
by conduct, words, or both.” 29 Although the meaning of this language is not
entirely self-evident, I think it is fair to interpret Schulhofer’s consent as having
two necessary components: (1) an uncoerced internal agreement/willingness to
engage in the relevant sex act, and (2) words, actions, or both that communicate
this agreement. 30
Rape reformers embrace expressive consent requirements believing such
requirements foreclose the distasteful argument, “she really wanted it despite
what she said.” 31 Critics reject expressive constructions because they criminalize
wanted sex in the absence of specific communication. 32 However, a careful
examination of the dynamics of consent as they play out in rape trials reveals this
debate may be much ado about nothing. Upon close analysis, it is clear that there
is little difference between applying internal and expressive consent. The real
debate lies in whether and how to limit what counts as evidence of internal or
external consent. Merely specifying that internal agreement also be
communicated, standing alone, does not greatly alter the rape consent inquiry.
In a rape trial with an internal consent standard, jurors will come to a
conclusion, not by speculating about the complainant’s internal state in the
abstract, but by considering the entire “consent transaction” between the
defendant and complainant. Let us take a very straight-forward internal consent
sexual assault provision: “It is a crime to knowingly or recklessly have sex
without consent.” How will the jury decide whether sex between two people, A
26. See, e.g., Kim Ferzan, Consent and Culpability, __ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. __ (forthcoming 2016)
(draft on file with author).
27. See generally MPC Draft 5, supra note 5.
28. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5 (“‘Consent’ means a person’s freely given agreement to
engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated by conduct, words, or both.”).
29. Id.
30. See Susan E. Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, By the Semi-Mystical Appearance of a Condom:
How Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX RES. 258, 259
(1999) (defining “consent” as “the freely given verbal or nonverbal communication of a feeling of willingness).
Schulhofer’s definition appears nearly identical to this definition.
31. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (expressing this concern).
32. See id. at 5 (discussing artificiality argument); see also infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
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& B, was consensual? I assert that the common view of a sexual consent
transaction involves the following three steps: (1) A internally decides to have
sex with B; (2) A displays external manifestations of that agreement; and (3)
from these external manifestations and the context, B concludes that A has
internally agreed to sex, and vice versa. 33 Thus, in a case where internal consent
is disputed, the prosecution will assert that A did not internally agree to sex; the
defense will respond that A did internally agree or B (reasonably) believed A
did; 34 and the jury, not being mind-readers, will resolve the issue by looking at
A’s external manifestations in context.35
Thus, in a purely internal consent inquiry, the jury will ultimately look at A’s
and B’s external behaviors in context to determine their respective intents
regarding the sex. One might wonder, then, whether requiring consent to be
communicated changes anything. If any type of external manifestation combined
with any type of context evidence can count as communication, the answer is,
“no.” In other words, the world of evidence that the jury can consider in
determining internal agreement is co-extensive with the world of evidence that
the jury can consider in determining expressive consent. Thus, expressive
consent simply collapses into the indications of consent the jury would look at to
determine A’s mental state. However, not all expressive consent proposals allow
all external manifestations and all context evidence to count toward consent.
B. Affirmative Consent
Affirmative consent standards generally seek to limit both the world of
external manifestations that express consent and the ways in which those external
manifestations can be contextualized. The Venn diagrams on the following page
provide a sense of the difference between saying that “A must express internal
consent” and “A must give affirmative consent.”
The Affirmative Consent circle can be larger or smaller depending on the
strictness of the affirmative consent rule. The narrowest construction of
affirmative consent discussed―and frequently scorned―by the public is the
signed, notarized contract. Only a miniscule subset of sexual communication, if
any at all, involves this particular external manifestation. However, as Professor
Schulhofer points out, the contract version of affirmative consent is largely a

33. In this symposium, Schulhofer does not really take up the issue of what “free” agreement means, so
although it is a hotly debated issue within the American Law Institute (ALI), I leave that debate for another day.
For a deeper inquiry into consent and a diagram of the “consent transaction,” see Gruber, Consent Confusion,
supra note 19.
34. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 52 (specifying a mens rea of knowledge or subjective recklessness
for sexual assault, in contrast to the many jurisdictions that adopt a negligence).
35. A and B will likely diverge in their accounts of the external manifestations and the context, in which
case the jury will consider evidence corroborating or undermining the parties’ factual claims and other indicia
of credibility, as in any other type of trial.
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product of the derisive discourse of reform opponents who seek to make a
mockery of the standard. 36
1. Broad Expressive Consent

External Manifestations
Indicating Internal Consent

2. Narrow Affirmative Consent

External Manifestations
Indicating Internal Consent

&
External Manifestations
Counting as Expressive
Consent

Affirmative
Consent

More realistically, affirmative consent can be understood as requiring A, the
sex acceptor, to utter the word “yes.” 37 This definition is reflected in the common
sentiment, expressed in the blogosphere, on college campuses, and by some legal
reformers, that “only yes means yes.” 38 Despite the “yes” requirement’s benefit
of administrability, many acknowledge that insisting on a specific word to
legitimize sex is artificial and unrealistic, given the heterodoxy of intimate
signaling. 39 Consequently, common forms of affirmative consent allow for some
interpretive license in determining what amounts to a “yes.”
From my perusal of the web, college regulations, and affirmative consent
statutes, it seems that there is a burgeoning consensus on what affirmative
consent requires: a person seeking intercourse must stop, explicitly seek

36. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3 (chiding the “popular media” for describing affirmative
consent in “preposterous” terms of written contract); see also Callie Beusman, ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws will Not
Ruin Sex Forever despite Idiotic Fears, JEZEBEL (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/yes-means-yeslaws-will-not-ruin-sex-forever-despite-i-1630704944 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
37. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 2 (noting this argument).
38. See, e.g., Student Rights and Policies, Appendix B: College Sexual Misconduct Policy, AMHERST
COLL., available at https://www.amherst.edu/mm/77199 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Relying on non-verbal communication can lead to
misunderstanding…in the absence of an outward demonstration, consent does not exist.”); cf. Tovia Smith,
Campuses Consider Following New York’s Lead On ‘Yes Means Yes’ Policy, NPR (July 8, 2015, 6:34 PM)
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225048/ campuses-consider-following-new-yorks-lead-on-yes-means-yespolicy (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting the governor as characterizing NY’s
affirmative consent bill as requiring “[t]he other person…to say yes. It’s yes on both sides.”).
39. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10 (calling it “absurd” to “insist[] that nothing except the
word ‘yes’ can establish consent”).
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permission, and obtain permission in some “clear” form. 40 This stop-and-ask
approach puts a legally enforceable obligation on the sex proponent (often
imagined as male) to seek and obtain a “yes”―or perhaps its functional
equivalent―from the sex acceptor (imagined as female). 41 Many affirmative
consent formulations also specify that affirmative consent be ongoing. 42 Taken
literally, this might require the sex acceptor to utter an extended “yyyeeeesssss”
throughout a make-out session and sexual intercourse. However, the
“continuous” and “ongoing” language likely means that the stop-and-ask
performance must be repeated at certain critical times throughout a sexual
encounter, whatever those may be. 43
Consequently, a common understanding of what affirmative consent requires
is something like this: (1) A and B are kissing or making-out; (2) B stops and
forthrightly asks for permission to have intercourse (“Do you want to do it,”
“Let’s have sex,” etc.); and (3) A clearly responds in the affirmative (“I want to
have sex,” “Let’s get it on,” etc.). There is no question that partners sometimes
communicate sexual consent using such a script. However, the existing social
science tells using this type of a script is more exception than rule.44 Thus, even
the less rigid forms of affirmative consent make up a small subset of the universe
of ways in which consent is currently communicated.45 Consent to sex is often
expressed through a fluid series of actions. Mutually agreeable sex often involves
no direct questioning. Consent is often understood through ambiguous statements
and context. Professor Schulhofer acknowledges as much, stating that
“increasingly intimate foreplay” can sufficiently signal agreement.46

40. See, e.g., WESLEYAN UNIV., 2015–2016 UNIVERSITY STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS 23 (2015),
available at http://www.wesleyan.edu/studentaffairs/studenthandbook/20152016studenthandbook.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Consent must be freely and affirmatively communicated
between all individuals in order to participate in sexual activity or behavior. It can be expressed either by words
or clear, unambiguous actions. It is the responsibility of the person who wants to engage in sexual activity to
insure consent of their partner(s)”).
41. See S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Ch. 748) (requiring the sex
proponent to “ensure” that there is affirmative consent).
42. See Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, YALE UNIV., http://smr.yale.edu/
sexual-misconduct-policies-and-definitions (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) [hereinafter “Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies”] (“Consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual
encounter.”).
43. Cf. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (requiring consent to a “specific act”); MPC Draft 5,
supra note 5, at 32 (requiring consent for “each act”). For a more in depth discussion of specific affirmative
consent rules and the arguments for and against them, see Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19.
44. See Johnson & Hoover, supra note 9, at 2–3 (noting extensive findings that young people continue to
regard men as sexual proponents and women as sexual gatekeepers and citing studies).
45. Cf. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3 (acknowledging that the “absence of any sign of
unwillingness is a common way to communicate receptivity”).
46. Id.
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Affirmative consent proponents seek to limit the world of consent indicators
for a variety of reasons. 47 Proponents characterize reform as necessary to counter
state actors’ and jurors’ mistaken, or worse sexist, beliefs that anything and
everything counts as consent. 48 Moreover, when the law allows ambiguous
behavior to be explained by context, it invites the jury to look at prejudicial
things like “promiscuity,” manner of dress, and past sexual behavior.49 The
corresponding contention is that affirmative consent rules make factual
determinations of actual agreement more accurate. 50 Critics respond that juries
are not necessarily retrogressive and may actually be accurate,51 given that sexual
consent is often nonverbal, ambiguous, and signaled through passive
engagement. 52 Further, evidentiary rules, including specialized ones, already
exist to control prejudicial context evidence. 53 In any case, highly sexist state
actors and jurors prone to nullification can disregard an affirmative consent law
just as easily as they can ordinary consent laws. 54
Affirmative consent reformers rejoin that even if people do not currently
perform consent affirmatively, they should. 55 The criminal law, they argue,
expresses a behavioral norm that people must conform to, even if common
practice is to do otherwise. So long as individuals have notice of the proscription,
47. Since Schulhofer does not in fact endorse a narrow affirmative consent requirement, these reasons
do not really apply to his proposal. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. Thus, my discussion of
arguments in favor of affirmative consent here is brief. For a fuller catalogue of the pro and con arguments in
the affirmative consent debate. See Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19.
48. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6 (characterizing open communication as normal); Beatrice
Diehl, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 508 (2015)
(stating that an affirmative consent standard will combat jurors’ adherence to “rape myths” about how women
communicate about sex and clarify the “confusion” by establishing that only yes means yes); cf. Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 652–54 (opining that reasonable consent will reflect a male-oriented
point of view).
49. Cf. Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies, supra note 42 (creating an affirmative consent standard to
discourage “[p]resumptions based upon contextual factors (such as clothing, alcohol consumption, or
dancing)”).
50. See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2.
51. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11 (noting this argument).
52. See Terry P. Humphreys & Mélanie M. Brousseau, The Sexual Consent Scale–Revised:
Development, Reliability, and Preliminary Validity, 47 J. OF SEX RES. 420, 421 (2010), and studies cited
therein.
53. See FED. R. OF EVID. 412; see generally Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to
Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002) (discussing
rape shield laws).
54. This is actually an empirical question of whether there is a subset of sexist decision makers who
would acquit under a regular consent standard but convict under an affirmative consent standard. It is difficult
to imagine that this group is very big. More likely, the overtly sexist juror is a lost cause and the people affected
by the change will be nonsexist jurors, who examine the evidence fairly in determining consent or lack thereof.
Affirmative consent laws might make these jurors feel obligated to convict because there was no specific stopand-ask performance, even when they conclude the complainant consented and communicated that consent.
55. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results
of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1356 (2005) (analogizing affirmative
consent to civil rights laws that “led popular culture”).
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it is fair to enforce the new norm through authoritarian means. 56 This is the most
contested aspect of affirmative consent reform. Critics forcefully argue that it is
wrong to impose radically reformist norms of sexual behavior by incarcerating
those who merely engage in ordinary practices. 57 This makes too much typical
behavior criminal and vests the government with too much prosecutorial
discretion—discretion it may apply in a discriminatory manner. 58 Some also
instinctively blanch at this vision of a sex regulatory state that mandates
dispassionate negotiation over passionate desire.59
In sum, the touted benefits of affirmative consent include controlling sexist
juries, reducing prejudicial and traumatizing contextual evidence, and
establishing a liberatory and clear norm of sexual communication.60 The
purported drawbacks include punishing people who reasonably discern consent,
granting too much discretionary authority to police and prosecutors, and creating
a sex regulatory state.61 The narrower the definition of affirmative consent, the
greater the benefits and drawbacks. I believe that the critics have the better of the
arguments, for reasons I explain in more detail elsewhere.62 Those with a healthy
skepticism of carceral authority should be very circumspect about forcing
compliance with emerging sexual norms through criminal punishment.
Moreover, it is fair to worry that the new-found punitive authority to prohibit a
substantial amount of currently lawful sex will presage unanticipated and
random, if not racialized and harmful, distributional effects.63 Finally, one with
feminist sensibilities can certainly question whether the stop-and-ask norm is
merely a more administrable, sanitized, and legalistic form of the “traditional”
sex script in which men are sexual proponents and women are gatekeepers.
However, I need not belabor those arguments here, as Schulhofer’s expressive
consent formulation, for the most part, creates neither the benefits nor the
problems of affirmative consent.

56. See infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text for discussion of this contention.
57. See, e.g., Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes’, TIME (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (lauding the goals of affirmative consent, but stating that “having the government dictate
how people should behave in sexual encounters is hardly the way to go about it”).
58. See U.S. DEP’T OF J., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 OVERVIEW, at
Table 43, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/
tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf. (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that,
as with all violent crimes, the proportion of blacks arrested for sexual offenses far exceeds the proportion of
black in society).
59. In turn, some affirmative consent proponents have turned to cringe-worthy public relations
campaigns to establish that “affirmative consent” is sexy.
60. See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2.
61. Id. at 13.
62. See Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19; Aya Gruber, Rape Revisited, __ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
__ (forthcoming 2016).
63. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 15–16.
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C. Expressive Consent
Recall that Schulhofer’s expressive consent standard requires A to
“communicate[] [agreement] by conduct, words, or both.” 64 In turn, B must “look
for” such “affirmative indications of willingness.” 65 Does this require B to stop,
deliberately solicit, and receive clear permission? It appears not, given that B
must merely “look for” signals of agreement and not actively pursue them. 66 The
issue, then, is whether Schulhofer means to differentiate “affirmative indications
of willingness” from all possible external manifestations of internal agreement.
Although the use of the word “affirmative” indicates that this may be the case,
Schulhofer elsewhere makes clear that he does not seek to limit what counts as a
communication of willingness.67 His definition specifically provides that consent
“may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” 68 Those circumstances
include things like increasingly intimate foreplay, ambiguous statements
rendered meaningful in context, and anything else a person with “common sense”
would think communicates agreement.69 Another thing that can in certain
circumstances count as consent is silence. 70 Schulhofer explains:
[A] contextually sensitive standard of consent-by-conduct should leave
room for considering silence and passivity, together with all other
circumstances, in assessing whether a person’s conduct communicates
positive agreement. The point to stress is that while silence and passivity
cannot by themselves be treated as consent, they are forms of conduct,
and all of a person’s conduct should be taken into account. This approach
avoids the artificiality of positing that silent acquiescence can never
constitute consent. 71
Schulhofer’s standard, like the internal consent inquiry, counsels decision-makers
to look at all of A’s external manifestations within the particular context of the
case to determine whether A’s state of mind was one of willingness (or B
believed it was).72 The standard seeks to avoid “artificiality,” which is to say that
it rejects an aspirational norm that strays too far from actual sexual
communicative practices.73 In this sense, the expressive consent standard is more
properly characterized as norm-reflecting rather than norm-changing.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 4.
See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4.
See The Feminist Challenge, supra note 1, at 2181.
Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 4–5.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 4.
See id. (advocating looking at the totality of a person’s behavior to determine willingness).
Id. at 5.
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Nevertheless, Schulhofer’s resistance to artificiality has its limits. He gives
the jury free reign to interpret the external manifestations in context and
determine internal agreement, with one notable exception: the jury may not infer
that A internally agreed if A’s external manifestations include a no (a “verbal
expression of unwillingness”), unless A engaged in “subsequent words or actions
indicating consent.” 74 While this formula recalls a no-means-no standard, it is
actually more like “no means no unless it means yes.” Any subsequent—though
curiously not preceding or simultaneous—words or actions indicating consent
can counter the “no.” These post-“no” words or actions do not have to be of a
special quality. Thus, if a jury is assessing a package of communication that
happens to include a “no,” its analysis remains unchanged, so long as the
complainant did something after the no.
In any case, even with the modified no-means-no provision, the expressive
consent formulation is far from yes means yes. It might be up for debate whether
even this qualified no-means-no standard is too artificial and arbitrarily excludes
reasonable consent scenarios, 75 or whether its costs are outweighed by the need
to check society’s tendency to think that no means yes more often than it actually
does. 76 However, I will put the no-means-no issue aside for now. The point is
that Schulhofer’s version of affirmative consent bears little resemblance to sexual
assault laws and policies that mandate contracts, yeses, or Q&As. 77
Under his standard, people do not have to materially shift their views about
manifestations that indicate agreement. The jury retains wide discretion to decide
whether the external manifestations, in context, indicate internal agreement. 78 It
remains free to look at any relevant admissible circumstance to contextualize the
external manifestations.79 Verdicts can reflect a range of views regarding proper
sexual communication, and, indeed, such views may diverge sharply from the
enlightened sex script.80 Accordingly, Schulhofer’s standard, properly
understood, will not appeal to those who tout affirmative consent for its ability to
strictly confine juror discretion, eliminate “bad” or ordeal-inducing context
evidence, and establish norms of clear sexual communication.
74. Id. at 5.
75. For example, A says no laughingly while directing B’s intimate parts towards his or hers.
76. For example, creating a social norm that no must always mean no.
77. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
78. Compare id. at 4–5 (“a contextually sensitive standard of consent-by-conduct should leave room for
considering silence and passivity, together with all other circumstances, in assessing whether a person’s conduct
communicates positive agreement”) with Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies, supra note 42 (requiring “direct
communication” and disallowing “[p]resumptions based on contextual factors”).
79. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that the finder of fact is free to look at the
surrounding circumstances).
80. That is, unless Schulhofer here uses the word “affirmative” to mean that the indications of consent
must be of a certain character (like verbal or unambiguous). However, I do not think the word is meant to
manage the external manifestation analysis in this manner. Rather, I think Schulhofer is directing sexproponents to search the liaison record for indications of consent as opposed to not caring or, worse, proceeding
in the face of indications of nonconsent. Again, the word “affirmative” here is unnecessarily confounding.
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At the same time, the formula avoids many of the common critiques directed
at affirmative consent. The standard is not very sex regulatory. It does not require
magic words, or any words, and all contextualizing evidence is fair game. 81 So
long as there are common-sense signs of agreement, sex is beyond the purview of
the criminal law. 82 Sex proponents may thus proceed on equivocal signals that,
under the specific circumstances, indicate agreement.83 Given that the proposal is
virtually indistinguishable from the ordinary consent inquiry, one might be
wondering whether there is a critique here. There is. Part III will discuss the costs
associated with both the framing and substance of the project.84 Professor
Schulhofer believes his reframing of consent is a subtle but crucial reform that
covers gaps created by ordinary consent laws.85 However, the proposal is
mystifying—an imperfect compromise. Adding unnecessary complexity to an
area that demands clarity does not well serve the Model Penal Code and
American Law Institute (ALI) membership.
III. MIND THE GAPS
The expressive consent formulation purports to address a “large class of
cases [that] fall[] into a grey area where a person’s willingness to accept sexual
intimacy is unclear, but his or her ability to protest is also unclear”―cases
including “surprise, tonic immobility, and heavy drinking.” 86 Apparently, the
idea is that there are many situations where a victim does not protest because of a
lack of sufficient time, fright (unrelated to direct coercion), and debilitating
drunkenness and, in such situations, a jury applying an ordinary consent standard
would reason that such passivity constitutes consent. 87 Schulhofer, for example,
makes much of the possibility of injustice in cases involving precipitous
penetration. 88 Although his symposium essay does not provide concrete
examples, the MPC draft discusses at length a 1994 California case, People v.
Iniguez. 89 In that case, the victim stayed overnight at her friend’s house and was
raped by Iniguez, her friend’s fiancé, whom the victim had met that night. 90 The
victim was asleep face down in the living room when around one or two a.m., a
naked Iniguez approached her from behind, pulled down her pants, penetrated

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
See id. at 10–11.
See id. at 4 (recognizing that consent is often communicated equivocally).
See infra Part III.
See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
See People v. Iniguez, 872 P. 2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 61.
Iniguez, 872 P. 2d at 1184.
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her, ejaculated, and left.91 Because of the rapidity of Iniguez’s actions and the
frightening circumstances, the victim was unable to actively protest.92
Why is this a highlighted example of the need for affirmative, or at least
expressive, consent? Did a jury find that the victim consented because she failed
to say no? Was a judge persuaded that the defendant believed there was consent
because the victim did not resist or refuse? No. In fact, Iniguez’s case for consent
was so deficient that he conceded, on the stand no less, the victim had not
consented. 93 Instead, Iniguez’s attorney attempted to undermine the law’s
force/fear requirement by arguing that, in his drunken state, the defendant did not
realize he had placed the victim fear. 94 The jury rejected this argument and
convicted Iniguez of rape. 95 And although a court of appeals reversed for lack of
sufficient evidence that Iniguez used specific means to induce fear, 96 the
Supreme Court of California reinstated the conviction on the ground that the
distinctive coercive circumstances could lead the jury to reasonably conclude that
Iniguez placed the victim in fear. 97
The court of appeals’ decision might counsel in favor of some clarity on what
counts as “means of fear,” when such is statutorily required, but it is difficult to
see how Iniguez is even relevant to a debate over affirmative consent. 98 The jury
did not find that the victim’s silence and acquiescence constituted consent, and
they would not likely have done so in the absence of the defendant’s admission. 99
Instead, the jury seemed perfectly capable of looking at the situation, including
the defendant’s and victim’s behavior in context, and finding that the victim did
not agree to sex. 100 Now, there may be statutes that premise rape on a clear
expression of nonconsent, and under such statutes, silence would not fulfill the
actus reus. Schulhofer, for example, cites to a provision under New York law
clarifying that a felony third-degree rape conviction requires that “the victim

91. Id. at 1185.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1185–86 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2015)).
95. Id. at 1186.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1190 (“The jury could reasonably have concluded that under the totality of the circumstances,
this scenario, instigated and choreographed by defendant, created a situation in which Mercy genuinely and
reasonably responded with fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, and that such fear allowed him to
accomplish sexual intercourse with Mercy against her will.”).
98. The California Supreme Court favored a definition of force that included precipitous sex. See id. at
1189 (“Sudden, unconsented-to groping, disrobing, and ensuing sexual intercourse while one appears to lie
sleeping is an appalling and intolerable invasion of one’s personal autonomy that, in and of itself, would
reasonably cause one to react with fear.”).
99. Id.
100. Perhaps one could argue that this was just a good jury, and there are juries out there bent on
acquitting in an Iniguez situation. However, an expressive consent rule would hardly move such a sexist jury.
That jury would simply conclude that some movement or utterance by the victim expressed consent or find
consent through her passivity in context.
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clearly expressed that he or she did not consent.” 101 However, New York law
elsewhere fills that gap with a provision making it a crime to “engage[] in sexual
intercourse with another person without such person’s consent.” 102
Schulhofer and MPC Draft 5 also adopt the view that there is some
widespread phenomenon of women freezing in fright during intimate encounters,
going lifeless during sex, and being unable to seek justice under ordinary consent
standards. 103 Few would dispute that women who are suddenly viciously attacked
or face threatening, coercive circumstances (as in Iniguez) might instinctively
freeze or consciously decide that acquiescence is the safest route.104 But, it is also
fair to say that such immobilization is highly unlikely in ordinary intimate
encounters. 105 Moreover, assume there was an unusual case where a couple were
willingly kissing and the complainant suddenly became overwhelmingly
frightened—say, because of past, undisclosed trauma—and thereafter acquiesced,
or even feigned willingness, out of fear. One might rightly wonder whether
criminally punishing the defendant is appropriate in such a case. Nevertheless,
this is all somewhat beside the issue, which is whether the ordinary consent
standard equips juries to determine whether a placidly acquiescent party facing
an environmentally coercive situation has consented. 106 Simply, there is no
reason to believe that juries are unable to determine when a passive person, in the
given context, has agreed to sex.
The second gap that the expressive consent formula purports to fill is the
space between incapacitated sex, which is criminal, and highly intoxicated sex,
which may be highly disturbing, but is not illegal. 107 As Professor Schulhofer
notes, many rape codes severely penalize defendants for having sex with
incapacitated―basically unconscious―persons. 108 A subset of jurisdictions
criminalize sex with a person who is not blackout incapacitated but meets a
certain threshold of choice-defeating intoxication.109 The MPC currently

101. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2013).
102. Id. § 130.20.
103. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11; MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62 (calling “frozen
fright” a frequently recurring problem[]”).
104. The studies on freezing cited by the MPC Draft all discuss “paralysis,” “infantilism,” and “tonic
immobility” as responses to an extreme fear situation. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62.
105. Cf. Brian P. Marx et al., Tonic Immobility as an Evolved Predator Defense: Implications for Sexual
Assault Survivors, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 74, 79 (2008) (theorizing that sexual assault may
produce an involuntary passive response like those seen in animals facing extreme conditions, but postulating
that “[tonic immobility] ought to be more likely only after several behavioral strategies (i.e., escape, screaming,
and fighting back) have failed and general feelings of fear have escalated into extreme fear or panic”).
106. The case highlighted by MPC Draft 5 to illustrate this point, People v. Warren, 446 N. E. 2d 591,
593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), is inapposite. In that case, a stranger quickly carried the victim to the bushes, undressed
her, and had sex with her. The jury convicted, but the court of appeals reversed based on the antiquated
requirement of resistance, not because of its reading of consent. See MPC Draft, supra note 5, at 61.
107. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6.
108. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 81 & nn. 220–21 (citing cases).
109. See id. at 81–82 (discussing the different approaches and their complexities).
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prohibits sex with an intoxicated, but not unconscious, person only when the
defendant surreptitiously drugged the victim for the purpose of imposing sex.110
MPC Draft 5 significantly expands the intoxication provision and prohibits
intoxicated sex whenever the victim is in a state of “torpor,” that is, “laps[ing] in
and out of consciousness.” 111 The draft thus covers both intoxicated passed-out
victims and nearly passed-out victims, but Schulhofer worries that even the
broadened draft provision is under inclusive. 112 He envisions situations where the
complainant is conscious and not in a state of torpor, but is nonetheless
intoxicated enough that s/he does not or cannot meaningfully agree to sex, for
example, when the complainant is vomiting, moaning, and curling into a ball, but
not passing out. 113
In an ordinary consent inquiry, the jury will look at the totality of the
circumstances, including vomiting, moaning, and curling into a ball, etc., to
determine the complainant’s internal agreement or lack thereof. Depending on
what else is going on, a jury might find consent despite the complainant’s
significant intoxication, or nonconsent despite the complainant’s relative
sobriety. 114 Frankly, it is difficult to understand how an expressive consent
formula, or even a yes-means-yes standard, would helpfully intervene in the
drunkenness inquiry. Drunk complainants will likely exhibit a range of behavior
from “no” to “yes, yes, yes.” Whether “yes” is uttered says nothing about the
capacity of the utterer/non-utterer. There is no particular reason to believe that in
the universe of drunken sex, the cases involving a lack of affirmative expression
meaningfully overlap with the cases involving severe, consent-defeating, but not
unconscious or semiconscious, intoxication. Thus, affirmative consent only fills
the intoxication gap by perhaps putting more defendants in jail―some of whom
had sex with those who were too drunk to meaningfully consent and some of
whom did not. 115
Expressive consent will fare even worse at managing drunkenness cases than
stronger affirmative consent formulations. Instructing the jury to look for
expressions of consent will not do much to increase the conviction rate of those
who have sex with intoxicated individuals, given that in the vast majority of

110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1.
111. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 85.
112. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6.
113. See id. (intending the expressive consent rule to address intoxication cases not covered by
incapacity, or even “torpor” rules).
114. Some universities policies indicate that in cases of mutual intoxication, even the more passive party
would is liable―a suggestion that should give all of us pause. See, e.g., COLUMBIA UNIV., GENDER-BASED
MISCONDUCT POLICY FOR STUDENTS (POLICY) 20–21 (revised Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
115. See supra notes 108–14, and accompanying text (explaining it does not necessarily make the
drunkenness inquiry more accurate).
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cases there will be something that counts as expression. 116 In fact, an explicit
directive to look at expressions could have the effect of leading the jury to focus
on the fact of communication rather than the intoxicated origin of it.
In the end, the gap-filling arguments demonstrate Schulhofer’s skepticism of
people’s ability to divine the true meaning of silence and passivity. The
requirement of communicative consent is meant to push back against the
assumption that consent to sex is perpetually present until an unequivocal
refusal. 117 We would not assume that the person sitting next to us in a conference
room consents to sex with us just because s/he hasn’t expressed a lack of desire,
he explains, so we should not assume that complainants consent to defendants
just because they do not protest.118 But, this argument collapses two very distinct
scenarios. Of course, most ordinary citizens would say it is outrageous for
individuals to presume that anyone and everyone in proximity wants to have sex
them. And a person who acted on such a presumption by, for instance, following
another from the conference room to the bathroom and precipitously penetrating
them, would almost certainly be convicted under any consent standard.
However, disputed consent cases present a different scenario altogether:
Defendants assume consent, not because of the complainant’s bare existence, but
because of specific interactions on the relevant occasion. The thorny issue is the
intricacy of sexual interaction―the many interpretable things that happen
between sitting in a conference room and lying naked on a hotel bed. 119 We do
not have to worry about the Iniguez’s, the crawl-through-the-window surprise
attackers, or the bathroom stalkers being exonerated. They will be convicted
under ordinary consent laws. Today’s controversies involve deciding exactly
when a person is permitted to conclude that consent exists based on pre-sex
intimate interactions―what occurs in between the boardroom and the
bedroom. 120
The expressive consent proposal largely does not weigh in on how to
interpret various external manifestations.121 Indeed, it is difficult to envision how
the proposal will fill a passivity-silence gap when it allows omissions, in context,
to count as consent. Ultimately, the law directs the jury to look at both parties’

116. MPC Draft 5 cites the infamous St. John’s rape case as a situation in which the expressive consent
formula might helpfully intervene. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62. In that case, the victim was extremely
intoxicated when several men performed sex acts on her. The men argued that she actively consented to the
incident and lied about it later to protect her reputation. The jury ultimately sided with the defense due to
“inconsistencies” in the prosecution’s case. See E.R. Shipp, Sex Assault Cases: St. John’s Verdict Touches Off
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1991), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/25/nyregion/sex-assaultcases-st-john-s-verdict-touches-off-debate.html?pagewanted=all (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review). How would the requirement that the complainant express consent have changed the outcome?
117. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (critiquing the presumption that silence equals consent).
118. Conversation with Schulhofer at MPC Sexual Assault Project Advisers’ meeting (Oct. 2015).
119. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (discussing context).
120. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
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actions and inactions before intimate contact, during foreplay, and after
intercourse to determine whether there was consent.122 The fact that the
expressive consent standard does not resolve difficulties in interpreting passivity
and silence is evidenced elsewhere in Schulhofer’s proposal. 123 To check juries’
tendency to think failure to protest always equates with consent, Schulhofer adds
this specific provision: “Lack of physical or verbal resistance does not by itself
constitute consent.” 124
Consequently, the expressive consent formulation has a solution-in-searchof-a-problem quality: It seeks to fill nonexistent gaps, and those that cannot be
filled merely by requiring communicative consent. This, combined with the
observation in Part I that Schulhofer’s formula is not a radical departure from
ordinary internal consent standards, appears to render the formula
neutral―neither a radically progressive reform, nor a disastrous mistake.
However, the fact that the expressive consent proposal avoids some popular
critiques of affirmative consent does not mean it is beyond reproach. The next
Section discusses the problems with both the framing and the substance of the
proposal.
IV. WHAT’S IN A NAME?
In his essay, and in MPC Draft 5, Schulhofer discusses and dismisses many
of the common criticisms of affirmative consent—criticisms that affirmative
consent is artificial, regulatory, punitive, and potentially discriminatory. 125 He
argues that his formulation of affirmative consent is not artificial, carceral, etc. 126
However, this argument is not a defense of affirmative consent so much as
confirmation that Schulhofer’s formula is not affirmative consent. It is because
expressive consent is virtually indistinguishable from ordinary consent, that it is
not prone to the artificiality critique. 127 It is because expressive consent is far
broader than affirmative consent that it does not amplify the regulatory authority
of the state or grant greater discretion to police and prosecutors.128 As a result,
one cannot accuse Professor Schulhofer of setting up a radical carceral standard
that greatly diverges from ordinary cultural practices. My critique of his modest
proposal is, therefore, modest.
Simply put, Schulhofer’s expressive consent standard is unduly confusing
and not an improvement on straightforward sexual assault laws that prohibit sex

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id.
See id. at 15; supra notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
Save, perhaps, for the no-means-no provision. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11–13.
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“against the will” or “without consent” in the ordinary meaning of those terms. 129
The problems with Schulhofer’s standard are both external―a matter of
labeling—and internal—a matter of the actual operation of the standard.
Externally, the term “affirmative consent” may confuse people about the nature
of the expressive consent proposal and lead them to believe that the MPC is
adopting some form of a yes-means-yes or stop-and-ask standard. Internally, it
will be practically difficult for jurors and jurists to apply a consent standard
unmoored from complainants’ intent and tethered to an undefined
communicative threshold.
Turning to the external issues, Schulhofer and MPC Draft 5 refer to
expressive consent as “affirmative consent,” with all that implies, rather than
“consent” or even “expressive consent.” 130 When those versed in sexual assault
issues confront the term “affirmative consent,” they get an idea of what the law
involves. Some will think contract or verbal yes. 131 Many will think the standard
entails something slightly less onerous. Again, I believe the burgeoning
consensus is that affirmative consent requires something like stopping and
asking. 132 In any case, I would venture that the vast majority of knowledgeable
commentators understand affirmative consent to, at some level, regulate the type
of communication that counts as consent.
Calling the proposal “affirmative consent” may have been a strategic attempt
both to gain support from affirmative consent-loving prosecutors and feminist
activists and to satisfy more skeptical defense attorneys and libertarians with the
actual substance of the provision. One should not, however, achieve by artifice
that which he cannot through political consensus. In any case, the taxonomical
move has resulted in considerable confusion. As it stands, American Law
Institute members on both sides of the debate have different notions of what the
MPC Draft 5 provision entails, and many appear under the mistaken impression
that the provision limits, in some fashion, the external manifestations that count
as communicative consent. 133 Anti-rape activists who laud the draft for including
“affirmative consent” understand it to preclude defendants from arguing that
kissing or even making-out, without more direct communication, counts as
consent. 134 Civil libertarians who critique the draft fear that it requires a contract,
a verbal “yes,” or at least stopping and asking. 135
129. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 58–60, and n. 150 (listing jurisdictions that adopt a definition of
sexual assault as sex without consent, including those that, as opposed to specifying that there must be verbal
agreement, allow the jury to determine consent in its “ordinary usage”).
130. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3–5.
131. See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134–35.
134. Conversation with former prosecutors at MPC Sexual Assault Project Advisers’ Meeting (Oct.
2015).
135. See Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, SIGNS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://signsjournal.org/
currents-affirmative-consent/halley/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Judith Shulevitz,
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Furthermore, Schulhofer’s substantive comments and the MPC Draft 5
commentaries appear to defend more robust versions of affirmative consent. 136
Schulhofer is sometimes careful to distance his proposal from narrow affirmative
consent programs in order to demonstrate that a given critique is inapposite. 137
His response to the artificiality concern, for instance, distinguishes broad
expressive consent from “written contracts, artificial verbal formulas or any other
unrealistic behavioral ritual.” 138 Other times, Schulhofer makes arguments that
defend the narrowest and most contrived versions of affirmative consent, like the
contract. 139 Consider his argument on social norms: “Using criminal law to
discredit widespread but harmful social norms can be fair and effective.” 140 This
argument could apply with equal force to a “nudge” and a “shove” that diverges
greatly from existing practice. 141 In fact, MPC Draft 5 forcefully argues that
criminal law’s punitive nature makes it a particularly appropriate tool of radical
social change:
Because criminal law is the site of the most afflictive sanctions that
public authority can bring to bear on individuals . . . it must often be
called upon to help shape [social] norms by communicating effectively
the conditions under which commonplace or seemingly innocuous
behavior can be unacceptably abusive or dangerous. 142
Those who consider sex-without-a-yes a dangerous, though commonplace, social
practice can easily invoke Schulhofer’s argument that the criminal law should be
used to “discredit” it.
Perhaps more troubling is Schulhofer’s treatment of the incarceration and
discretion arguments. In response to the contention that his proposal can
exacerbate the problems of severe criminal punishment and mass incarceration,
the Professor asserts that concerns over harsh sentencing “should not drive . . .
substantive offense definitions,” 143 and that “sexual offense policy is [not] a
cause” of mass incarceration. 144 The disaggregating of sexual assault liability
from high sentences and the human rights nightmare that is mass incarceration—

Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judithshulevitz-regulating-sex.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
136. See, e.g., Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10-11 (requiring more than passive silence for
consent).
137. See id. at 3 (calling the contract version of affirmative consent “preposterous”).
138. Id. at 16.
139. See infra text accompanying note 142.
140. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14.
141. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607, 619 (2000).
142. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 15.
143. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 15.
144. Id. at 13.
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a questionable tactic in and of itself—immunizes any sex regulation from
structural and consequentialist critique. One could, for example, defend
outlawing sex without a contract or even prohibiting sex during college by
postulating that such laws could carry modest sentences and speculating that they
would not significantly increase the incarcerated population.
Similarly, Schulhofer writes off worries over prosecutors using broad
affirmative consent laws to coerce pleas in cases of weak evidence because,
given numerous existing “fallback” charges, such a “troublesome dynamic” will
inevitably persist. 145 These arguments about norm-shaping, the liabilitypunishment divide, and prosecutorial discretion rationalize, or minimize the costs
of, expanding criminal liability in general. They are not tailored justifications of
the more modest expressive consent proposal. Accordingly, such contentions
typically presage radical punitive reform and often appear in the debate over
norm-changing affirmative consent provisions, like yes means yes.
To be sure, Schulhofer’s use of the “affirmative consent” label may simply
reflect some Machiavellian genius in crafting a law that at first glance appears to,
but does not actually, impose a yes-means-yes requirement, in order to further its
adoption as a social norm without the cost of incarcerating reasonable actors. But
this is a dangerous tactic. Jurisdictions may adopt, and prosecutors, police, and
jurors may apply the MPC provisions in their apparent form―requiring an
unequivocal, if not verbal, communication of agreement.146 Moreover, those with
more regulatory notions of affirmative consent will draw on the many pro-reform
arguments in Schulhofer’s essay and MPC Draft 5’s commentary, like the
argument that norm shifting is worth carceral costs, to support more radical and
punitive reform. 147
The problems are not resolved merely by renaming the proposal “consent”
rather than the more freighted “affirmative consent.” There are complexity issues
created by unmooring the consent inquiry from the complainant’s mental state
and mandating a communication threshold without specifying what it is. To
begin, let us look at an internal consent standard and Schulhofer’s expressiveconsent formulation side by side, highlighting the differences:
Penetration without Consent: It is a crime for an actor to knowingly or
recklessly engage in an act of sexual penetration with a person who has
not consented [internally agreed] to an act of sexual penetration.
Schulhofer’s Penetration without Affirmative Consent: It is a crime for
an actor to knowingly or recklessly engage in an act of sexual penetration
with a person who has not “freely given agreement to engage in a
145. Id.
146. UNWANTED SEX, supra note 1, at 27.
147. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14–15 (explaining that criminal laws can promote social
change).
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specific act of sexual penetration, [and] communicated [that agreement]
by conduct, words, or both.” 148
In the ordinary consent inquiry, the actus reus is satisfied when the
complainant has not internally agreed to have sex. To be sure, the factfinder will
ultimately look at external manifestations to determine the complainant’s mental
state, as explained in Part I. 149 However, if the jury is convinced that the
complainant did agree, there is no further actus reus inquiry, and the defendant is
not guilty. Schulhofer’s standard, by contrast, requires two conditions for lawful
sex: internal agreement and external communication.150 Consequently, the
defendant commits a crime if the complainant did not freely mentally agree or if
the free mental agreement was not communicated. I have argued in Part I that
Schulhofer means these two requirements to be coextensive, that is, a jury can
use the very same evidence and analysis it would use to determine the
complainant’s mental state to determine whether there is communication. 151 This
is made clear by Schulhofer’s comment that communication “need not take any
particular form.” 152 Given that all signs of willingness count as expressions of
consent, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the jury has enough
evidence to determine that the complainant internally agreed, but does not have
sufficient evidence to find communication. Therefore, Schulhofer’s second
prong, properly understood, is fairly superfluous. 153
The problem is that the expressive consent proposal, on its face, seems to
require the jury to make an additional factual determination that the complainant
engage in a certain package of external manifestations that meets some threshold
for sufficient communication. The requirement of “communicat[ion] by conduct,
words, or both” can easily be interpreted to limit the world of external
manifestations that properly communicate agreement to only positive and active
signals. 154 Thus, although Schulhofer intends things like omissions,
contextualized passivity, and foreplay to count as “communication,” this is not
apparent from the proposed language. 155 I believe that Schulhofer put in the
phrase “words, actions, or both” as a defendant-friendly maneuver to clarify that
sufficient communication is not limited to words, but also includes nonverbal
signals. Nevertheless, one could very well reason that the standard would not
insist on “words, actions, or both” if silence and passivity could sufficiently
148. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). I do not make much of the fact that the affirmative consent formula uses
the word “given.” See supra notes and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes and accompanying text.
150. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
151. See supra Part I.
152. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4.
153. The prong does not greatly risk that a defendant who engaged in wanted sex will be punished for
failing to receive magic words.
154. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5.
155. Id. at 4–5.
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communicate agreement. Correspondingly, Schulhofer’s formulation could leave
a jury with the impression that consent must be expressed through specific types
of signals, although it is not totally evident which ones. If the objective is simply
to ensure that legal actors’ and factfinders’ inquiries involve “ordinary” and
“common sense” notions of consent based on a sincere evaluation of the entire
situation, the requirement of communication through words or actions confuses
and even undermines this objective.156
A similar confusion will be present in cases that hinge on defendants’ mens
rea. In an ordinary consent inquiry, once again, the jury will look at external
manifestations in context, along with evidence about the defendant’s mental
constitution, to determine whether the defendant knew or realized the substantial
risk that the complainant did not internally agree to sex. 157 Schulhofer’s
definition of consent has the additional requirement that the internal agreement
be communicated. 158 The defendant must therefore argue both that s/he believed
that the complainant internally agreed and that s/he believed the complainant
sufficiently communicated that agreement through words, actions, or both.
Parsing the difference, if any, between the belief that one’s partner is
agreeing to sex and the belief that one’s partner is expressing agreement to sex is
confusing, to say the least. Do defendants come to different conclusions about
whether a complainant internally consented and whether s/he engaged in
behavior that sufficiently expressed consent? Probably not. A person who
sincerely believes that a sexual partner is consenting is very likely to also believe
that the partner is expressing consent.
Nevertheless, let us try to imagine the operation of this perplexing dual mens
rea inquiry at trial. Take, for example, a case involving “increasingly intimate
foreplay” between A and B that culminates in sexual penetration.159 At trial, the
prosecution asserts that A did not want to have sex. The defense responds that,
given A’s energetic foreplay, B believed A wanted to have sex. After an
examination of the details of the liaison, the jury concludes that B honestly and
even reasonably believed A wanted to have sex. However, the following
exchange occurs at trial:
Prosecution: You testified that you believed A wanted to have sex, but
isn’t it true that A never said anything to the effect of, “I want to have
sex?”
B: That’s true.

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 4.
The expressive consent proposal does not adopt a negligence mens rea. See supra note 34.
See Affirmative Consent, supra, note 2, at 5 (requiring conduct show consent).
Id. at 4.
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Prosecution: So you inferred that A consented, but A actually never
communicated the agreement.
B: Yes.
Now, in Schulhofer’s view, the defense has every right to argue that inferring
agreement from foreplay is perfectly acceptable under the expressive consent
law. But the point is that the defender, prosecutor, jury, judge, complainant, and
defendant could very well believe that whether the defendant inferred internal
agreement from the totality of the circumstances is a different question from
whether the defendant believed the complainant sufficiently communicated that
agreement through words or actions. Thus, in the example above, the jury could
conclude both that the defendant reasonably believed that the complainant agreed
to sex and that the defendant realized a substantial risk that “communication” of
the consent was insufficient. I think it is unwise to have jurors engage in the
oblique inquiry of whether the defendant believed, not that the complainant
agreed to sex, but that the complainant engaged in a package of behavior that
amounts, under some objective but undefined standard, to communicative
consent.
V. CONCLUSION
Stephen Schulhofer, along with his co-reporter Erin Murphy, has engaged in
an impressive and important effort to reform the sorely outdated MPC provisions
on sexual assault. 160 I believe that Professor Schulhofer is earnest in his effort to
draft criminal laws that reflect societal views of acceptable and unacceptable sex
and protect the vulnerable from harmful sexual aggression, without punishing
acceptable sexual practice. Moreover, I take Schulhofer’s point that there is a
histrionic verve to the accusations that his proposal requires contracts, is fascistic
regulation, or incorporates a presumption of guilt. Nevertheless, Schulhofer
makes a mistake by seeking to exploit the energy of the popular affirmative
consent reform juggernaut, without reckoning with the fact that the contours and
values of that reform movement differ substantially from his own.
Engaging in the affirmative consent debate is to talk of contracts, yes means
yes, and express permission. If Schulhofer’s desire is to avoid those types of
“artificial” requirements, he should not use the word “affirmative” in conjunction
with his proposal. Given that Schulhofer intends to craft a sexual assault law that
incorporates a common sense and intuitive version of sexual consent, the
language of his proposal should just say so. 161 It should simply prohibit sex
without consent as a baseline, leaving room for increasing the penalty for

160. See generally MPC Draft 5, supra note 5.
161. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4.
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aggravated forms of sexual misconduct (acting in the face of active resistance,
taking advantage of fear, using force, etc.). Abandoning the affirmative consent
label and its communicative directives provides an additional benefit: it relieves
Schulhofer of the need to defend criminal law as an appropriate means to shift
sexual norms and to downplay the problems of high sentences, prosecutorial
coercion, and mass incarceration. The history of U.S. mass incarceration counsels
that reformers should exercise caution when using criminal law to regulate risk,
achieve aspirational goals, and vindicate even feminist-progressive ideals.
Professor Schulhofer is clearly a judicious superintendent of punitive authority
and accordingly should not communicate an enthusiastic “yes” to affirmative
consent.
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